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“As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces.  
But when you see it in practice you see the difference personalities make”  
– Henry Kissinger, former-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, in 1974 - 
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In 1969, the Municipal Port Management of Rotterdam (hereinafter: the Port 
Management) proposed the first concrete ideas for an expansion of the port by 
Maasvlakte II. This Port Management is a department of the Municipality of 
Rotterdam and, as a result, decisions are made by the City Council. Within a few 
years these plans were put on ice, as a result of resistance from the local nature 
preservation and environmental pressure groups and the national government.
1
 
Moreover, in the 1970s the decrease of the transhipment made an expansion 
unnecessary. Twenty years later, a new political basis was provided for port 
expansion. In order to fight the 1980s crisis, the Dutch national government chose the 
transport sector as the spearhead of national policy. In order to stimulate this sector, 
two ‘mainports’, or important distribution hubs, were pointed out as the economic 
centres of the Netherlands.
2
 These were airport Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam. 
Moreover, the Cabinet decided to create an integral planning procedure for the 
regions around the mainports. For example, in 1991, in the region of the port of 
Rotterdam, projects for the stimulation of the economic development were linked to 
the creation of new nature reserves.  
This new national policy gave the Port Management fresh impetus to create a 
new plan for a port expansion. In 1991, the plan for Maasvlakte II was presented and 
almost immediately added to the integral plan for the port region and linked to the 
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creation of 750 hectares of nature reserve. The need for a port expansion was, not 
only, based on the lack of harbour plots, but also the idea that deeper docks were 
needed to welcome the increasingly larger containerships. Especially, in the 1990s, 
fast growth of the container sector was expected. The Port Management of Rotterdam 
was convinced that the Dutch national government would subsidize the Maasvlakte II 
port expansion. For example, in the past 1/3 was paid by the Municipality and 2/3 by 
the national government.
3
 As a result, it was expected that within the foreseeable 
future, the national government would grand a public subsidy, making the port 
expansion possible.    
 
 
Figure 1: Maasvlakte II (in yellow) 
 
Source: Port of Rotterdam (2013) 
 
 
However, after five years of negotiating between 1993 and 1998, still no 
definitive decision was made. What is more, the Ministry of Finance still refused to 
spend public money on the project, as it distrusted the usefulness and necessity of the 
project.
4
 In addition, nature preservation and environmental pressure groups 
convinced the government, to include an alternative to Maasvlakte II to the spatial 
shortage of the Port of Rotterdam.
5
 For example, the expansion of another port in the 
Southwest of the Netherlands was proposed. However, despite the resistance in 2008 
the construction began. Moreover not only, did the pressure groups and national 
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government accept the port expansion, but they also began to support it. This raises 
the main question: why did fierce resistance during the decision-making process of 
Maasvlakte II, changed into full support (1993-2008)? It is argued in this paper that 
entrepreneurship of individuals was of essential importance.  
The goal of this paper is to illustrate the first conclusions of my PhD-research 
into the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II. No earlier research about 
Maasvlakte II through a historical perspective has been done, although it is an 
important addition to current research on the port expansion. For example, earlier port 
expansions (1950-1970) strongly influence the decision-making process of 
Maasvlakte II. For this research, new primary sources are used from the Port 
Management of Rotterdam, the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Finance and 
Transport and the most involved nature preservation and environmental pressure 
groups (hereinafter: the pressure groups).
6
 In addition, more than thirty interviews 
were conducted, from among others the Minister of Transport (1998-2002), Port 
Directors and directors of pressure groups.  
In the first section, theory on entrepreneurship is put forward, as it helps to 
show which forces were of essential importance for the success of the decision-
making process of Maasvlakte II. Success is within this context defined as: the 
accomplishment of the aim to construct Maasvlakte II, with broad support of the 
governments (the local and national government) and the nature preservation and 
environmental pressure groups. In the second and third section, in order to elucidate 
this success, the decision-making process is divided into two distinct parts: the 
financial and spatial planning track. In the case of Maasvlakte II, agreements on both 
tracks were equally important. On the spatial track resistance of the pressure groups 
had to be settled and on the financial track the opposition of the Ministry of Finance 
had to be coped with. 
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§1 Theory: entrepreneurship and megaprojects 
 
In this paper it is argued that the success of the decision-making process of 
Maasvlakte II was based on successfully applied strategies. Responsible actors for 
these strategies were entrepreneurs. In 1984, John Kingdon for the first time linked 
this entrepreneurship to public actors. He defined these policy entrepreneurs as: 
‘advocates for proposals or for the prominence of ideas’ in the public sector.7 Within 
this context these are person with a key role in the decision-making process, which 
can be characterized by risk taking behaviour and willingness to spend time, money 
and reputation to achieve their goals. In addition DeLeon (1995) notes that policy 
entrepreneurs are involved in the policy change process – from idea development to 
implementation.  
 Especially, the DeLeons addition strongly decreases the number of possible 
policy entrepreneurs in the case of a megaproject, as such a project tends to have a 
longer decision-making process than a normal project.
8
 Furthermore, as a megaproject 
is also more complex than a normal project, one could argue that the number of good 
informed persons is also lower than during a normal project.
9
 These two distinct 
characteristics of megaprojects on the number of influential persons is defined here as 
the ‘megaproject effect’. As a result of this effect a clear distinction has to be made 
between long and short involvement (see Table 1). The hypothesis is that persons that 
are long involved tend to have more influence on the decision-making process. 
Influence is measured by comparing the wishes at the beginning of the decision-
making process to the eventual outcome. Another division which is made, is between 
policy entrepreneurs (civil servants) and political entrepreneurs (politicians).
10
 The 
policy entrepreneurs have foremost an advising role and have, as a result, directing 
power. The political entrepreneurs have the eventual say in the acceptance or rejection 
of the project. In other words, decisive power.  
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Table 1: entrepreneurs and megaprojects 
National and local Civil servants 
 
Politicians 
 
Long involvement Considerable directing power Considerable decisive power 
Short involvement Limited directing power Limited decisive power 
Source: made by Dirk M. Koppenol (2014). 
 
Successful entrepreneurship cannot, however, be separated from ruling ideas about 
the content of the strategies, as it must be acceptable to the public and politicians in 
order to be successful. To define these ruling ideas the discourse coalitions approach 
is used. This term was introduced in the influential book of Maarten Hajer The 
politics of environmental discourse, as an addition to earlier approaches towards 
policy-making, such as the more traditional advocacy coalitions approach.
11
 The most 
important addition of Hajer is that his approach focuses on groups of organizations 
with shared ‘normative and causal believes’ (advocacy coalitions), but on groups of 
organizations with shared terms and concepts (discourse coalitions).
12
  In short, to 
illustrate this with the case of Maasvlakte II, his approach does not only focus on the 
supporters and opponents of the port expansion by Maasvlakte II, but on groups that 
share a common understanding of economic and ecologic development of the port 
region in general. In order to come to structural cooperation, pressure groups should 
be part of the same discourse coalition as the government. The discourse coalition 
approach is used in this paper to clarify the debate between the pressure groups and 
the government.  
Entrepreneurs also need freedom to act, to implement their strategies. In other 
words, it strongly dependents on the political climate and other actors involved, 
whether certain persons are given the freedom to implement their strategies. For 
example, whether a Port Director can implement a strategy, strongly dependents on 
the political climate in the City Council and the attitude of the Port Alderman.  
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All in all, with regard to entrepreneurship the ruling ideas and the freedom to 
act are taken into account. After the description of the decision-making process in the 
following sections, in the conclusion, the persons longest involved are put forward, in 
order to theorize about the influence of entrepreneurs in decision-making processes of 
megaprojects. 
 
§2  Financial track: towards corporatization 
There is always conflict about public spending, as it is a political decision, to which 
project money is given. Moreover, the Minister of Finance has the task to reduce the 
costs of projects. However, this cannot explain two outcomes of the financing of 
Maasvlakte II. The 2004 corporatization of the Municipal Port Management of 
Rotterdam and the 2005 national governmental 30 percent buy-in through shares in 
this corporatized company. Both the corporatization and the buy-in were 
preconditions of the Ministry of Finance to invest in Maasvlakte II. In order to 
understand this outcome, it is, firstly, important to explain how the idea for a 
corporatized came into being. In other words, which persons were involved? 
Furthermore, why the Ministry of Finance began to demand the corporatization. 
Moreover, why the City Council of Rotterdam accepted the corporatization of their 
most profitable department.  
 
Already during the late 1980s, the idea emerged for the corporatization of the Port 
Management in order to improve the efficiency of the management of the port.
13
 
However, especially from 1993 and onwards it was the new Port Director Willem 
Scholten, who saw it as his personal goal to give the Port Management a more 
independent status.
14
 In 1992, Scholten became the new director. He was generally 
considered to be a skilled negotiator and a strategic thinker.
15
 Moreover, he had a 
great personal charm, but was also has sometimes the characteristics of ‘an absolute 
ruler or autocrat’.16 In a 2012 interview he responded to the question: who had most 
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influence on the decision-making process? ‘I [was] the personification of Maasvlakte 
II’.17   
In contrast to Scholten, the City Council wanted to keep the Port Management 
under local political control as it was seen as a public entity.
18
 In addition, it was the 
most profitable department, which transferred ninety percent of its profit to the 
treasury of the Municipality. As a result, a corporatization was also financially 
unbeneficial. Furthermore, in the City Council it was regarded as outrageous to sell 
shares to the national government in order to finance a port expansion.  
The wish of the Port Management to become more independent and the sense 
of urgency for the financial acceptance of Maasvlakte II coincided perfectly. Mid-
1990s, the Mayor of Rotterdam Bram Peper and the Port Director Scholten were 
frustrated by the refusals of the Ministry of Finance to subsidize Maasvlakte II.
19
 
Between 1984 and 1998 Peper was the Rotterdam Mayor. As no other, Peper tried as 
mayor to fight for the development of the port. In order to influence national politics, 
he used his political channels of the Labour Party to directly contact the Ministers. 
Important in this context is that a Mayor in the Netherlands is appointed, rather than 
elected. As a result, a Mayor has a reasonably independent status. In 1997, according 
to Mayor Peper, Minister Gerrit Zalm could not be convinced of the fact that the 
expansion of the port of Rotterdam was of national importance.
20
 Also the role of 
Zalm stayed of great importance as he was Minister Finance between 1994 and 2002 
and 2003 and 2007, in other words, almost during the complete length of the decision-
making process (1993-2008).    
In 1997, in order to convince Zalm of the need of Maasvlakte II, Mayor Peper 
approached chairman of the Social Economic Council of the Netherlands – Sociaal 
Economisch Raad (SER) Klaas de Vries, who was an acquaintance and also a party 
associate of the Labour Party.
21
 January 1998, in direct contact with the Minister of 
Transport, De Vries became the chairman of the committee. Other members were 
Mayor Peper, Port Director Scholten, two Aldermen of Rotterdam, and seven high 
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officials of the most involved Ministries and the representatives of the unions and 
employers organizations.
22
 The goal of the committee was officially to inquire the 
positioning of the Port Management as port manager of the Rotterdam harbour and 
industrial complex. However, according to Peper the only reason for the 
establishment of the committee was to convince the Minister of Finance to subsidize 
Maasvlakte II.
23
 Through the committee the national importance of the Port of 
Rotterdam could be proved and Zalm was given the opportunity to earn from his 
investment in Maasvlakte II by corporatizing the Port Management and buying 
shares.  
The conclusion of Committee De Vries resulted in the 1998 establishment of a 
national committee, attended by all involved Ministries, including the Ministry of 
Finance.
24
 The goal of this national committee was to develop an integral and 
coherent vision on the development of the Port of Rotterdam.
25
 It would take, 
however, another three year before Zalm would demand a corporatization.  
 
Zalm had his own agenda. In 1998, critical public and political questions were posed 
about the usefulness and necessity of one of the megaprojects his Ministry had 
accepted during the early 1990s. More specific, it was doubted whether this 
megaproject - the Betuweroute, which is a dedicated goods rail link to the German 
border, would ever become profitable.
26
 The reason why the Ministry of Finance had 
agreed on the construction of this 5 billion euro (prices 2004) project was the national 
governments focus on the transport sector. In 1995, for example, the national 
government decided to create a special fund for the strengthening of the Dutch 
economic structure – Fonds Economische Structuurversterking (FES). The goal of 
this fund was to invest in the Dutch economy for the future generation.
27
 Besides the 
specific political focus, also large cash flows were available. In the 1959, the largest 
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gas field in Europe was discovered in the Netherlands and especially from 1975 and 
onwards large quantities of money from gas sales and taxes flowed into the public 
treasury.  
In order not to lose face Minister of Finance Zalm was determined to find 
definitive proof of the usefulness and necessity of a project before accepting a 
subsidy. He was backed by the Netherland Bureaus of Economic Policy Analysis – 
Centraal Planbureau (CPB). This advisory body had a monopoly on the analysis of 
policy documents of the Dutch parliament and the Ministry of Finance. As a result, its 
reports were of great influence on the discussion about megaprojects such as 
Maasvlakte II. In 1997, the CPB argued in its report that the estimates of the Port 
Management about the shortage of harbour plots were wrong. According to it the 
discussion about a port expansion should be postponed to 2010-2015.
28
 This 
countered the report of the Port Management in which it was argued that the port 
would lack space around 2000.
29
 The deviation in outcomes, was based on difference 
in approach. The Port Management based the need for new harbour plots on vision. 
According to them the port should always have a few hundred hectares in reserve in 
order to accommodate new companies. In other words, in their opinion the dock 
should be ready before a ship could be welcomed. This contrasted to the calculated 
approach of the CPB, which was supported by the Ministry of Finance, which 
focussed on the most efficient use of the harbour plots and most beneficial 
exploitation. They wanted to delay the construction of the port expansion until the 
port was fully filled up, to construct Maasvlakte II on demand. The negative stance of 
the Ministry of Finance towards the financing of this port expansion must be placed in 
this context. In other words, the Ministry was not per se against the public financing 
of the project, but not on the short term.
30
 
In 1998, although the CPB still considered an investment in a port expansion 
useless and unnecessary, Zalm was forced to start an investigation into the financing 
of the project as the spatial problem of Rotterdam became a project of national 
importance. This was one of the reasons why the Ministry proposed to the Cabinet to 
inquire a Public Private Partnership for the project. On the one hand the private sector 
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could judge about the profitability of such an expansion and, furthermore, part of the 
investment in the project could be funded by this sector.
31
 The idea of a Public Private 
Partnership was part of the neo-liberalistic wind, which got grip on Dutch politics. For 
example, in the 1998 coalition agreement, it was underlined that the Public Private 
Partnership practice in the Netherlands should be stimulated.
 32
  
However, between 1999 and 2000, it became increasingly more evident that a 
Public Private Partnership would be impossible. In 2000, the Municipality of 
Rotterdam rejected it.
33
  Foremost, the Municipality argued that the management of 
the port should not be divided between a private exploiter and the Port Management. 
In addition, as according to the local government the procedure was taking too long. 
For example, in the two years between 1998 and 2000 still no definitive steps were 
taken towards a Public Private Partnership. Besides the negative stance of the 
Municipality of Rotterdam, two other developments resulted in the end to the Public 
Private Partnership idea. Firstly, the financial trajectory was overtaken by the spatial 
planning trajectory. Whereas in 2001 the final agreement was signed for the national 
spatial law between the pressure groups and the governments (the local and national 
government), the Ministry of Finance still did not reach a final decision about the 
financing of the project. As a result, the Public Private Partnership became a burden 
rather than an advantage. Furthermore, the national government experienced a period 
of high economic growth and, as a result, a fast increase of income. As a civil servant 
involved in the Public Private Partnership project argued that the Ministry of Finance 
had enormous cash flows coming, why use a difficult way of financing, if there was 
an easier alternative?
34
    
 In 2001, as a Public Private Partnership became increasingly less likely, and 
the CPB produced a positive cost-benefit analysis, the Ministry of Finance showed the 
willingness to publicly finance the project.
35
 However, in order not to lose face, as 
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had happened during the Betuweroute, Zalm demanded the corporatization of the port 
management and a buy-in as a precondition for the financing of Maasvlakte II.
36
 Two 
pillars supported Zalms demand. Firstly, he wanted to earn from the investment in 
Maasvlakte II. Secondly, the Minister wanted to have a say in the management of the 
port. Not only, because the management of the port was seen as a national and not a 
local duty, but also to directly influence the steering of the port. Paradoxically, Zalm 
now demanded for a partial nationalization, although the corporatization was inspired 
by the neo-liberal thought of more market-orientation.   
All in all, the strategy of Mayor Peper and Port Director Scholten to contact 
De Vries for an inquiry was a success, as Minister of finance Zalm accepted to 
finance Maasvlakte II. However, it still has to be explained why the City Council 
accepted the corporatization of their most profitable department – the Port 
Management. During the period 1996 and 2004 the political steering was weak. No 
less than five different Port Alderman came and went during this period of eight 
years. Furthermore, already since 1984 Mayor Peper was in office, making him a 
dominant figure within the political arena in Rotterdam. As a result, Mayor Peper and 
Port Director Scholten had the freedom to create their risky plans.  
 After 2000 the City Council experienced increasingly more pressure from the 
Ministry of Finance to corporatize its Port Management. As the dominant party, the 
Labour Party, was strongly in favour of the creation of Maasvlakte II, along the way 
corporatization became acceptable, but only under the precondition that 100 percent 
of the shares would be owned by the Municipality. Also here the Port Management, 
under leadership of Scholten had a distinct role. As Scholten had to advice the City 
Council on behalf of the Port Management, the City Council was strongly depended 
on him. When in 2001 the City Council started an inquiry into the possible change of 
the legal status of the Port Management, it was Scholten, who was part of the 
inquiring committee.  
 The March 2002 elections eventually accelerated the process of 
corporatization. During the March 2002 local elections the new right-wing party 
Leefbaar Rotterdam (translated. Livable Rotterdam) won 35 percent of the votes and 
the former largest party, the Labour Party, fell back from 30 percent in 1998 to 22 
percent in 2002. This was an earthquake in the political situation in Rotterdam, 
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because since the Second World War no coalition had been created without the 
Labour Party. Paradoxically, although the party leader of Leefbaar Rotterdam Pim 
Fortuyn was against the corporatization of the Port Management and the construction 
of Maasvlakte II, the rise of his party was an import stimulus to the process of the 
corporatization and financing of Maasvlakte II.
37
 An important reason was that 
Leefbaar Rotterdam had to cooperate with the Christian Democrats –Christen 
Democratisch Appèl (CDA) - and the Conservatives – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie (VVD), which were in favour of a corporatization. As a result, Leefbaar 
had to find a pragmatic solution in order to form a coalition. As a result, in 2004, the 
Port Management was corporatized and, in 2005, 30 percent of the shares were 
bought by the national government.  
 
 
§2 Spatial track: towards cooperation  
 
The Port Management under leadership of Scholten was also active on the spatial 
track. In contrast to the financial track, not the Ministry of Finance, but the nature 
preservation and environmental pressure groups had to be convinced of the usefulness 
and necessity of Maasvlakte II. Based on Charles Tilly’s much cited definition of 
social movements, Wim van Noord created a definition of the environmental pressure 
groups: ‘a composition of actors and activities aimed against harm to nature and the 
landscape, the depletion of energy sources and raw materials and air, water and 
ground pollution.‘38 In this case the focus is specifically on organizations which try to 
safe nature and the landscape from harm (nature preservation organisations) and those 
which fight air, water and ground pollution (environmental organisations). The nature 
preservation organizations were stakeholders as they managed the nature reserves 
around the port mouth and the city of Rotterdam. Moreover, the environmental 
pressure groups were involved as they were concerned about the direct and indirect 
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effect of economic activities on Maasvlakte II on the liveability in region of the port, 
such as an increase of traffic. 
During the twenty years since the 1970s, the nature preservation and 
environmental pressure groups changed from protest to cooperative organizations.
39
 
This had several reasons: Firstly, during the 1980s and 1980s unemployment in the 
Netherlands arose and the economy recovered slowly from the oil crises. As a result, 
they were aware of the need for projects to stimulate the economy. Secondly, the 
pressure groups began to favour cooperation with the governments and companies in 
contrast to protest. This was caused by the fast growth of the pressure groups in terms 
of members. The total membership of the four largest national pressure groups 
increased from 412,000 members in 1980 to 2,036,000 in 1995.
40
 In other words, the 
number of members increased fivefold. As a result, they grew in organizational size. 
This made them more independent on the contribution of their members, which made 
them less radical. Thirdly, the protest against infrastructural projects in the 
Netherlands showed them that they were only able to delay a project; however, they 
were unable to actually realise their ideas. These three reasons stimulated them to try 
to increase their influence at the beginning of a decision-making process rather than at 
the end.  
The most involved nature preservation and environmental pressure groups in 
the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II were organized in one umbrella 
organization. In 1996, Arno Steekelenburg, employee of a provincial environmental 
pressure group based in Rotterdam – Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland -, established this 
umbrella organization ‘ConSept’, which was a cooperation of seven nature 
preservation and environmental pressure groups active in the Province of Zuid-
Holland. Their procedural goal was to improve the cooperation between the public 
and private sector in the discussion on Maasvlakte II by cooperating from the first 
phase of the decision-making process.
41
 Their literal goal was to add as much 
measures to increase the liveability and create as much new nature as possible, 
without using juridical procedures.  
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In other words, one could argue that in contrast to the 1970s, in the 1990s the 
pressure groups and the governments, including the Port Management, were part of 
the same discourse coalition. Whereas, in the early 1970s there were two discourse 
coalitions: one supporting and another resisting economic growth, in the 1990s both 
the pressure groups and the government supported the goal to stimulate the economy 
and simultaneously improve the liveability. In 1993, the Port Management linked its 
plan for Maasvlakte II to the national plan to develop the region around the port with 
a double goal: stimulate the economy and create new nature reserves. The pressure 
groups were in support of this approach. As a result, conflict was not about the 
content - growth or no growth, but about the procedure – how much influence the 
pressure groups would be given. However, trust had to grow before the pressure 
groups and the governments were able to cooperate and make fast steps towards a 
general agreement. The chairman of one of the pressure groups – Milieufederatie 
Zuid-Holland – argued that the pressure groups and the Port Management agreed on 
80 to 90 percent of the content, but only began to understand this after active 
cooperation.
42
  
Trust grew only through cooperation, but it was at the same time distrust 
which blockaded effective cooperation. The local and national government distrusted 
the pressure groups as they were afraid that these groups would use the inside 
information during the meetings against them. Furthermore, some Ministers still 
considered the choice for a megaproject a political decision. Consequently, only 
influence during a later phase in the decision-making process was seen as appropriate.  
 Simultaneously the pressure groups distrusted the government. Being part of a 
formal cooperative organization did not only strengthen, but also weaken the position 
of the pressure groups. On the one hand these pressure groups could directly discuss 
matters concerning the decision-making process to the minister and ask for inquiries. 
On the other hand they bound themselves to the eventual outcome of the process, as 
they were part of the decision-making process organization. As a result, the pressure 
groups were keen on influencing the decision-making process as much as possible, in 
order to justify their cooperation with the government to their members. 
In 1996, in order to keep the nature preservation and environmental pressure 
groups on board, the Ministry of Transport decided to include the pressure groups in 
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the meetings on national level. However, the mid-1998 change of Cabinet resulted in 
a confrontation with the pressure groups. The new Minister of Transport Tineke 
Netelenbos of the Labour Party refused to share further information with the pressure 
groups. According to her, expertise of the pressure groups was wished for, but not at 
this stage.
43
 As a result, in 1999 the pressure groups officially rejected further 
cooperation with the national government in this matter.  
The stalemate between the Minister of Transport and the pressure groups, was 
the direct incentive of the Port Management under leadership of Scholten, to start 
talks with the pressure groups. Between 1996 and 2000 the Port Director of the Port 
Management Scholten saw the support for a fast acceptance of the Maasvlakte II 
project crumble. In 1998, in order to speed up the process, Port Director Scholten 
changed his strategy from focusing on the strong to focusing on the weak ties - from 
focusing on the Ministries, towards focusing on the pressure groups. This was a 
radical shift, as until1996 the pressure groups were basically ignored. Between 1998 
and 2000 a specific agreement, Visions and Courage – Visie en Durf,  was negotiated 
with ConSept and the two largest nature reserve managers.
44
 After the covenant 
Vision and Courage was signed Steekelenburg said: ‘it took long, a three to four years 
fight, to come to a serious dialog’.45 ‘However, with this plan we give a signal to the 
national government’46 Willem Scholten reacted that ‘this was a successful effort to 
put our point of views next to each other’.47 From their reaction it can be concluded 
that this approach was radically new for both parties. The agreement showed that 
there was no resistance against Maasvlakte II, as the pressure groups accepted an 
expansion by 1000 hectares net.
48
 Furthermore, the Port Management showed that it 
was prepared to give in. For example, it was agreed that Maasvlakte II would become 
1000 hectares net maximum, instead of earlier plans for a Maasvlakte II of 2000 
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hectares.
49
 Moreover, it was agreed upon that Maasvlakte II would be the last 
expansion towards the west. It other words, the expansion thrift of the port would 
come to an end.
50
 All in all, in the agreement the Port Management showed for the 
first time that it was prepared to moderate the size of the future port expansion and 
accept large compensation plans. As a result, the pressure groups began to support the 
expansion by Maasvlakte II. Important within this context was the role of 
Steekelenburg, who zealously tried to make ConSept work. 
The Vision and Courage agreement stimulated the process on national level as 
it resulted in trust between the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups 
and the Port Management. In 2001 a general agreement on the spatial planning track 
was signed.
51
 Between 2005 and 2008, however, again entrepreneurship was needed 
to overcome the disputes with some pressure groups. In 2005, against all expectations, 
the Council of State – Raad van State  - rejected the spatial law for Maasvlakte II 
based on appeals from some nature preservation and environmental pressure groups. 
However, this period showed the importance of the grown trust between the pressure 
groups, the local government and the Port Management.  
In order to avoid another conflict later on in the decision-making process, the 
Port Authority (before 2004: the Port Management) accepted a radical new strategy 
towards all stakeholders in the region.
52
 It was called Strategic Environment 
Management – Strategisch Omgevingsmanagement (SOM).53 The goal of SOM was to 
broaden the coalition by searching for all possible stakeholders in the Maasvlakte II 
project. As a result, more than 170 possible stakeholders, including nature 
preservation and environmental pressure groups, were identified and approached, 
although some of them did not even consider themselves to be a stakeholder.
54
 This 
broad search made it possible to find structural solutions for problems in the region 
and make deals and covenants if needed.  
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A large number of nature preservation and environmental pressure groups 
chose for a structural cooperation. May 2008, based on the Vision and Courage 
agreement, the Vision and Trust agreement – Visie en Vertrouwen - was signed.55 In 
other words, the work of among others Scholten and Steekelenburg formed to basis of 
this new agreement. The goal of Visions and Trust was to overcome the constant 
distrust between all parties, caused by political changes and new directors. 
Consequently, the Vision and Courage agreement had to be improved. Visions and 
Trust was a ‘non-personal’ agreement and it underlined, among others, the need to 
monitor the implementation of the agreement. The monitoring would continue for the 
coming decades. As a result, structural trust was created and the basis was set for 
further cooperation during port development.  
As a result, of the close cooperation between the governments and the pressure 
groups 35 projects were linked to the Maasvlakte II project in order to improve the 
liveability in the city of Rotterdam and around the port, including the creation of the 
750 hectares of new nature reserve north and south of the city of Rotterdam. The 
rejection of Maasvlakte II would for that reason also be a loss for the pressure groups. 
In 2008, by using this mutual gain approach, finally the construction of Maasvlakte II 
started with support of all pressure group.
56
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Early 1990s, it was expected by the Port Management that within the foreseeable 
future, the national government would accept a public subsidy, making the port 
expansion possible. However, after five year of decision-making between 1993 and 
1998, still no definitive decision was made, as a result of conflicts with the CPB and 
the Ministry of Finance, and the nature preservation and environmental pressure 
groups. Finally, in 2008, the construction began, but now the pressure groups and the 
Ministries, not only, accepted, but also fully supported the expansion. That is why the 
main question is: This raises the main question: why did fierce resistance during the 
decision-making process of Maasvlakte II, changed into full support (1993-2008)? 
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It can be concluded that the decision-making process was successful because 
of the ruling ideas and the entrepreneurship. In contrast to the 1970s, the pressure 
groups formed a discourse coalition with the governments, making cooperation 
easier. In other words, they supported the integral development of the port region. 
Furthermore, they changed from protest to cooperative oriented organizations. As a 
result, they were open for discussion. Moreover, as they were part of the same 
discourse coalition and had a cooperative stance, the discussion was more about the 
procedure than the content. More specific, about how much influence the pressure 
groups would be given. For example, after the cooperation between all involved 
parties became more intense and trust grew, fast agreements could be made. 
Furthermore, certain persons were able to leave a distinct mark on the project.  
 
Table 2: entrepreneurs and megaprojects (12 years or more in office) during the 
decision-making process of Maasvlakte II (1993-2008). 
 Policy 
 
Political 
 
Local Willem Scholten 
Port Director, 1992-2004 
Bram Peper 
Mayor of Rotterdam, 1984-1998 
 
(none) 
Aldermen 
 
National (none) 
Officials 
 
Gerrit Zalm 
Minister of Finance, 
1993-2002 and 2003-2008. 
 
 
As a result of the ‘megaproject effect’, which is the phenomenon that megaproject 
tend to be more complex and stretch out over a longer period than a normal project, 
the total number of entrepreneurs were three: Willem Scholten, Bram Peper and 
Gerrit Zalm.
57
 All three men were entrepreneurs as they had key positions in the 
decision-making process. Moreover, Peper and Scholten spend time, money and 
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reputation to create Maasvlakte II and Zalm tried zealously not to lose face, by trying 
to find a favourable financial solution to the project.  
A few conclusions can be drawn about the ‘megaproject effect’.  Firstly, these 
three persons became increasingly more important over time. For example, Scholten 
gained more influence as the management structure of the Port Management was 
changed along the way. Secondly, the most influential persons became closer during 
the process. Zalm and Scholten, for instance, eventually combined forced to persuade 
the City Council to corporatize the Port Management and finance Maasvlakte II. 
Thirdly, these persons had freedom to act as a result of the lack of other persons that 
were long in office. Scholten, for example, was able to act freely as there was no 
political continuity as a result of the fast shift of Port Aldermen. 
 Also a conclusions can be drawn about the outcome of the project in relation 
tot these entrepreneurs. It can be concluded that the organizations and Ministries 
which were represented by those who were longest in office during this megaproject, 
gained the most from the decision-making process. The Port Management was 
corporatized and Maasvlakte II was accepted; and the Ministry of Finance became 
partial owner of the port and began to earn from its investment in Maasvlakte II.  
Intriguingly, in the 1990s and 2000s, Maasvlakte II was one out of five 
decision-making processes of megaprojects in the Netherlands. As a result, one could 
argue, that as 1990s Dutch politics was dominated by the megaproject effect, national 
and local policy had a strong personal touch.  
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